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I explore the behavior of asset prices and the exchange rate in a two-country world. When the large
country has bad news, the relative price of the small country’s output declines. As a result, the small
country’s bonds are risky, and uncovered interest parity fails, with positive excess returns available
to investors who borrow at the large country’s interest rate and lend at the small country’s interest
rate. I use a diagrammatic approach to derive these and other results in a calibration-free way.
Ian Martin




ian.martin@gsb.stanford.eduAn extensive literature has documented the fact that interest-rate dierentials across countries
are not, on average, counteracted by osetting currency movements. As a result, it is possible to
earn excess returns by investing in high-interest-rate currencies and borrowing in low-interest-rate
currencies.
This paper presents a simple two-country model in which this failure of uncovered interest parity
(UIP)|also known as the forward premium puzzle|emerges in equilibrium. The outputs of the two
countries are imperfect substitutes for one another, so units matter, and there are two separate term
structures of interest rates, one for each good. Global nancial markets are assumed to be perfectly
integrated; assets are real rather than nominal, and are priced as if by a representative global investor
with power utility; there are no non-tradable goods, no liquidity issues, no portfolio constraints.
Even so, UIP fails to hold. Suppose, for example, that both countries have the same distribution
of output growth, and that one country is much smaller than the other. In equilibrium, the smaller
country has a higher short-term real interest rate. (Hassan (2009) documents that small countries
tend to have higher nominal interest rates.) As a result, UIP fails, since the small country's exchange
rate does not depreciate enough, on average, to oset the interest-rate dierential. In fact, on the
contrary, the exchange rate is expected to appreciate|an example of Siegel's (1972) \paradox"|so
UIP fails in the strong sense that this expected appreciation actually increases the expected excess
return on the carry trade.
Why does the smaller country have a higher interest rate? Any risk-based explanation must
provide a story for why the small country's bond underperforms in bad states of the world. In
the model considered here, bad states are those in which the large country experiences low output
growth, since its output contributes the majority of the representative investor's consumption. But
bad news for the large country corresponds to an increase in the relative supply of the small country's
good, and so to a depreciation in its exchange rate. This depreciation also causes the small-country
bond to underperform; hence the risk premium.
Figure 1 provides an illustration. It shows a sample realization over a two-year period, in a
numerical example in which output growth is i.i.d. across the two countries.1 Panel 1a plots the paths
of exogenous fundamentals: the outputs, or dividends, produced by the two countries. Initially, the
larger country (black line) contributes 80% of global output.2 After about 0.6 years, it experiences a
1Although the paper's theoretical results cover the case in which dividends are correlated across countries, I use this
i.i.d. example throughout the paper so that all correlations and asymmetries that emerge do so endogenously.
2The example is set up so that the exchange rate initially equals 1: thus the large country's time-0 output share, in
common units, is 4=(4 + 1) = 0:8. In the notation that will be introduced below|and labelling the small country as
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Figure 1: Sample paths of perpetuity prices in each currency, for dierent values of . Each gure
is plotted on a log scale, and is based on the same underlying path of fundamentals, shown in panel
(a).
3disaster that causes its output to drop; the smaller country experiences a similar disaster after about
1.5 years.
The panels below show how the behavior of perpetuity prices depends on the elasticity of sub-
stitution between goods, , with the large country's bond in black and the small country's bond in
red. The left-hand column sets  = 1, so that consumption is a Cobb-Douglas aggregator of the
two goods. Panels 1b and 1e illustrate the well-known feature of the Cobb-Douglas setup that bond
prices are constant in their own currency, despite the large shocks each country experiences. On the
other hand, the exchange rate is extremely volatile, so for example the price of the large country's
bond, denominated in the small country's units, jumps up when the large country experiences its
output disaster. The right-hand column shows the other extreme, in which the two goods are perfect
substitutes. The exchange rate eect disappears: panels 1d and 1g show that bond prices in the
perfect substitutes case are the same|and time-varying|in each set of units. Put crudely, in the
Cobb-Douglas case all the action is in exchange rates and none in valuation ratios, in conict with
the empirical evidence that movements in valuation ratios are a major driver of movements in asset
prices;3 and in the perfect substitutes case all the action is in valuation ratios and none in exchange
rates.
In between, both eects are present. Panel 1c shows that in large country units, exchange rate
movements exacerbate the poor performance of the small country's bond when the large country
suers its disaster. As a result, the small bond is riskier than the large bond, and so the overall level
of the small bond's price is lower, reecting higher interest rates in the small country and hence the
emergence of a carry trade. Notice, also, that the carry trade experiences severe underperformance
at times of large-country disaster. Panel 1f shows the corresponding plots viewed in small country
units. The large country's disaster reduces the relative supply of its good, so its currency appreciates.
In small-country units, the large country's bond therefore outperforms at the time of disaster and
hence is a hedge, so earns a negative excess return.
The price-dividend ratios of the output claims associated with each of the two countries also
depend on the relative size of the two economies, as in Cochrane, Longsta and Santa-Clara (2008)
and Martin (2011a). If, say, the large country experiences bad output news then the other country's
output share increases; its output claim is now riskier|more correlated with consumption growth|
so requires a higher excess return and a lower price-dividend ratio. In this way, shocks to one country
country 1, with a 20% output share|s0 = w = 0:2.
3See, for example, Campbell and Ammer (1993), or Cochrane (2008) for a recent survey.
4aect asset valuations in the other country. Furthermore, if goods are imperfect substitutes, then the
small country's currency depreciates when the large country experiences bad output news, as before.
This amplies the underperformance of the small-country output claim in large-country units. Figure
5, in the Appendix, illustrates this, using the same sample paths for output as Figure 1.
To what extent are these eects dependent on the particular numerical example chosen? Less
than one might think: the failure of UIP occurs in any calibration of the model, and I also provide
economically interpretable nonparametric conditions under which I am able to sign the direction
in which UIP fails|that is, to show when it is the small country whose bonds are risky, as in the
example above. An unusual feature of the paper is that it develops a method of demonstrating that
this relationship holds in a diagrammatic way via visual proofs. (These visual proofs were the original
route to the more conventional algebraic proofs which are also provided.) I apply this nonparametric
approach to show that various other relationships hold within the model, for example between risk
premia on the large and small countries' output claims, in own and foreign units.
Frankel (1980), Hansen and Hodrick (1980), and Fama (1984) are amongst the early contributions
to the literature on the forward premium puzzle. More recently, Brunnermeier, Nagel and Pedersen
(2008) and Jurek (2009) have emphasized the fact that realized returns on carry trade strategies are
negatively skewed. Burnside, Eichenbaum, Kleshchelski and Rebelo (2008) suggest that the excess
returns apparently available on the currency carry trade may reect a peso problem; but Jorda and
Taylor (2009) argue that the forward premium puzzle returns once one considers more sophisticated
carry trade strategies that exploit information about fundamentals. More generally, Dumas, Harvey
and Ruiz (2003) present evidence that international markets are well integrated; Lustig, Roussanov
and Verdelhan (2009) provide support for the idea that the behavior of international asset prices is
amenable to a risk-based explanation; and Hollield and Yaron (2001) argue that models of currency
risk premia should focus on real, as opposed to nominal, risk. Alvarez, Atkeson and Kehoe (2007),
working in a lognormal framework, emphasize the contrast between the data and the predictions of
conventional macroeconomic models.
Various theoretical models have been oered in response to this evidence. Verdelhan (2010)
considers a model with habit formation. Colacito and Croce (2010) and Bansal and Shaliastovich
(2010) argue that long-run risk, together with Epstein-Zin preferences, can explain the forward pre-
mium puzzle. Farhi, Fraiberger, Gabaix, Ranciere and Verdelhan (2009) construct a model featuring
rare disasters, and present supporting evidence from FX option data. Hassan (2009) linearizes a
two-period lognormal model with nontraded goods and introduces money via a cash-in-advance con-
5straint. Plantin and Shin (2008) present a game theoretic analysis in an environment with trading
frictions; their model endogenously generates sudden losses on the carry trade. Backus, Gavaz-
zoni, Telmer, and Zin (2010) explore the failure of UIP in a nominal, lognormal, framework with
exogenously specied Taylor rules.
This paper makes comparatively simple assumptions about preferences and cashows and em-
phasizes, instead, the interaction between intratemporal and intertemporal prices. Although the
ingredients of the model are fairly standard, it has not previously been solved. I compute asset
prices by extending the approach of Martin (2011a) to the imperfect substitution case; this avoids
the need to rely on log-linearizations, on log utility, or on a unit elasticity of substitution between
goods. The framework does allow for jumps, but none of the qualitative results depends on their
presence. However, allowing for the possibility of jumps shows that the results hold independently
of Merton's (1973) ICAPM, since the ICAPM does not hold once asset prices can jump.4 Moreover,
there is an increasingly large body of work that emphasizes the importance of nonlognormality in
nancial markets (Rietz (1988), Barro (2006), Martin (2011b)). The challenge is to allow for non-
lognormality without sacricing tractability; my approach lets me do so in a model that is hard to
solve even in the lognormal case. Cole and Obstfeld (1991), Zapatero (1995), Pavlova and Rigobon
(2007), and Stathopoulos (2009) also explore the consequences of intratemporal price adjustment,
but all four papers rely on assumptions of log utility and unit elasticity of substitution between
goods in deriving their analytical results. To my knowledge, no other papers in this literature derive
calibration-free results of the type derived here.
The next section discusses UIP and the forward premium puzzle, and lists some necessary ingre-
dients of any model in which UIP fails to hold. Section 2 sets up the model, which contains these
ingredients. Section 3 characterizes asset prices, the exchange rate, and expected returns. Section 4
considers the small-country limit. Section 5 concludes. All proofs are in the Appendix.
1 UIP and the forward premium puzzle
UIP is a conjectured relationship between next year's spot exchange rate between two countries,
et+1, today's spot exchange rate, et, and 1-year interest rates in each country, i1;t and i2;t:
E loget+1 = loget + i1;t   i2;t : (1)
4See Adler and Dumas (1983) for an early application of ICAPM logic to international nance.
6The thought behind (1) is this: if country 2 has a lower interest rate than country 1, surely this
should be compensated by the expected appreciation of its currency? Unfortunately this natural
idea is decisively rejected by the data: in the relationship
loget+1   loget = a0 + a1(i1;t   i2;t) + "t+1 ; (2)
UIP holds if a0 = 0 and a1 = 1. Typically, however, a1 is estimated to be close to zero, or even
negative.
An equivalent formulation of the UIP relationship exploits covered interest parity, which is the
no-arbitrage relationship between today's 1-year forward exchange rate, ft, today's spot exchange
rate, and the two countries' 1-year rates: logft = loget+i1;t i2;t. This shows that (1) is equivalent to
E loget+1 = logft. The failure of UIP can therefore be rephrased as the failure of forward exchange
rates to be unbiased predictors of future exchange rates.
We can also use the fact that et+1=et = M2;t+1=M1;t+1|where Mi;t+1 is the stochastic discount
factor that prices assets denominated in the units of country i, i = 1;2|to gain some understanding
of necessary ingredients of models that generate the violation of UIP. For, we can take logs then
expectations to conclude that, as an identity,
Etloget+1 = Et logM2;t+1   Et logM1;t+1 : (3)
Now, if M1;t+1 and M2;t+1 were roughly constant|as would be the case if either there were little
risk in the economy, or if investors were roughly risk-neutral|then we could approximate (3) by
Etloget+1  logEtM2;t+1   logEtM1;t+1 = i1;t   i2;t : (4)
That is, UIP can be formally justied in economies in which either the price or quantity of risk is
very low. Empirically, however, high Sharpe ratios|the equity premium puzzle|tell us that the
stochastic discount factors Mi;t+1 are volatile. Thus the move from (3) to (4) was not justied, and
we must take the eects of Jensen's inequality into account, arriving at the identity
Etloget+1 = i1;t   i2;t + logEtM1;t+1   Et logM1;t+1 | {z }
Lt(M1;t+1)




The terms Lt(Mi;t+1) measure the variability of the SDFs; following Backus, Chernov and Martin
(2011), I call Lt(Mi;t+1) the entropy of Mi;t+1. High SDF entropy translates into high attainable
expected risk-adjusted returns (Bansal and Lehmann (1997), Alvarez and Jermann (2005)), much as
high SDF volatility translates into high attainable Sharpe ratios (Hansen and Jagannathan (1991)).
7The identity (5) reveals some necessary ingredients of any model in which UIP fails to hold (a point
originally made by Fama (1984), and later revisited by Backus, Foresi and Telmer (2001)). First, as
discussed, the entropies of M1;t+1 and M2;t+1 must be non-zero and economically signicant: risk
must matter. Second, there must be an asymmetry: if the entropies were equal they would cancel out,
returning us to a world in which UIP held. Third, to generate the patterns found when estimating
(2), Lt(M1;t+1)   Lt(M2;t+1) should be small at times when i1;t   i2;t is high: if a country has high
interest rates then assets denominated in its currency should earn relatively low risk premia. The
model that follows has these properties.
2 Setup
There are two countries with output streams fD1tg and fD2tg respectively, at least one of which is
nondeterministic. I assume that global markets are perfectly integrated, so assets are priced by a






















Here w controls the relative importance of goods 1 and 2, and  2 [1;1) is the elasticity of in-
tratemporal substitution between the goods of the two assets. Write u(D1t;D2t)  C
1 
t =(1  
) for the instantaneous felicity function, ui(D1t;D2t) for the marginal utility of good i, et 
u2(D1t;D2t)=u1(D1t;D2t) for the intratemporal price of a unit of good 2 in units of good 1, and
Mi  e ( t)ui(D1;D2)=ui(D1t;D2t) for the stochastic discount factor that prices time- claims








which appears as Proposition 1 of Backus, Foresi and Telmer (2001) and as equation 1 of Brandt,
Cochrane and Santa-Clara (2006). For consistency with these papers, I will refer to et as the exchange
rate. (International economists would refer to it as the terms of trade.) When the relative supply of
country 2's good declines, its relative price|the exchange rate et|increases.





from Lucas's (1978) Euler equation. It is important to emphasize that the perturbation logic under-
lying (6) implies that the price Pit is denominated in units of good i.5 I use stars to indicate a price
not expressed in its own units: P
2t = P2tet and P
1t = P1t=et.
Similarly, the price of a perpetuity, or consol bond, that pays out a constant stream of good i




Mi d : (7)
The outputs of the two countries, D1t and D2t, are taken as exogenous|though they could also
be thought of as being determined by a production side of the economy that is left unmodelled
here|and are assumed to have dividend growth that is i.i.d. over time, though not necessarily across
countries. Formally, e yit  yit   yi0  logDit   logDi0 is a L evy process for i = 1;2. The relevant
properties of the dividend growth processes are conveniently summarized by the cumulant-generating
function (CGF) c(1;2)  logE[expf1(y1;t+1   y1;t) + 2(y2;t+1   y2;t)g].6
One of the main themes of the paper is that by exploiting general properties of CGFs, it is possible
to establish features of asset prices in this economy that hold not just for a particular calibration
but for a whole family of driving stochastic processes. The most important such property is that
CGFs are always convex. But I also nd it helpful to introduce three nonparametric properties,
each of which the CGF may or may not possess. The rst is the exchangeability property,7 which
holds if c(1;2) = c(2;1). This can be thought of as imposing a cet. par. assumption: it ensures
the two countries have the same means and volatilities of output growth, the same arrival rates of
jumps, and so on. It therefore focusses attention on the underlying economic mechanism and on
the consequences of asymmetry in country size alone. The second is the convex dierence property,
which is a restriction on the higher cumulants of log output growth. It holds in the lognormal
case, and more generally it ensures, roughly speaking, that output growth in each country is not
5In theory, a natural approach would be to work in dierent units|perhaps the price of the international consump-
tion bundle Ct. My approach is intended to mirror how nancial economists think, and work, in practice, i.e. in terms
of dollars and yen and so on, rather than some notion of a global unit of purchasing power.
6Cumulants and cumulant-generating functions are also discussed by Backus, Foresi and Telmer (2001), Backus,
Chernov and Martin (2011) and Martin (2010).
7Two random variables X1;X2 are said to be exchangeable if the joint distribution of (X1;X2) is the same as that
of (X2;X1).
9positively skewed. The third is the linked fundamentals property. In the lognormal case, it is natural
to consider imposing the economically plausible assumption that the correlation between the two
countries' output growth is nonnegative. The linked fundamentals property, which is the appropriate
generalization of this idea to arbitrary L evy processes, requires that the CGF is supermodular.
I illustrate the results with parametric examples. The framework permits these to be exibly
specied; I assume that the log outputs have a correlated Brownian motion component with drifts
i, volatilities i, i = 1;2, and correlation . There are also two kinds of jumps. The rst kind aects
country i idiosyncratically. The second hits both countries simultaneously; the sizes of such jumps
may or may not be correlated. Jumps arrive at times dictated by Poisson processes with arrival rates
!1 and !2 for the idiosyncratic jumps, and ! for the simultaneous jumps. Jump sizes are lognormal:
when country i experiences an idiosyncratic jump, the size of that jump is lognormal with mean J;i
and volatility J;i. When there is a simultaneous jump, the sizes of jumps in the two countries are
jointly lognormal, with means i, volatilities i and correlation . The resulting CGF is







































For notational convenience, let  = ( 1)= and b  = (+ 1)=. The variable  ranges between
0 (the Cobb-Douglas case) and 1 (the perfect substitutes case). I make the following assumptions:
Assumption 1.   1 and   1.
Assumption 2 (Finiteness conditions). Tastes and technologies are such that
   c[(1   b =2); b =2] > 0
   c[ b =2;(1   b =2)] > 0
   c[(1   1=   b =2); b =2] > 0
   c[ b =2;(1   1=   b =2)] > 0:
Typical estimates in the literature put both  and  somewhere in the range 2{10, so Assumption
1 is very mild. It implies that b   0. Assumption 2 requires that the discount rate is suciently
high. It ensures that expected utility is nite, as I show in the course of proving Result 2.
103 Prices, interest rates and expected returns
Price-dividend ratios, interest rates, expected returns, and the exchange rate depend on the relative
sizes of the two countries. The appendix shows that country 1's share of world output denominated
in common units, st  D1t=(D1t+etD2t) 2 (0;1), can be used as the state variable for the economy.
In some respects, though, it is more natural to use b ut, a monotonic transformation of st, as the state
variable: b ut  log[(1   st)=st]. I express formulas in terms of b ut, but plot graphs against the more
easily interpreted st. I drop subscripts when referring to the current (time-0) value of either variable,
so s = s0 and b u = b u0. If country 1 has a small share of output, s is small and b u is large.
Result 1 (Exchange rate). The exchange rate et can be expressed in terms of b ut via
et = [(1   w)=w](1 )=  e [(1 )=]b ut: (9)






= c(   1;1   )dt; (10)






= c(1   ;   1)dt: (11)
The average expected appreciation, (FX
1 + FX
2)=2, is positive|an example of Siegel's (1972)
\paradox".
Figure 2a shows how the exchange rate varies as a function of country 1's output share. When
country 1 is small, its goods are in short supply so command a high price. (In the perfect-substitutes
case,  = 1, the relative price would always equal 1, independent of country 1's output share.) The
gure assumes that the representative investor has time preference rate  = 0:04 and risk aversion
 = 4; that the weight of country 1 in the consumption aggregator is w = 0:2, and the elasticity
of substitution between goods is  = 2; and that the parameters governing technologies are, in the
notation of (8), 1 = 2 = 0:02, 1 = 2 = 0:1,  = 0, !1 = !2 = 0:02, J1 = J2 =  0:2,
J1 = J2 = 0:1, and ! = 0. I choose these parameter values to prove a clean illustration of the
model because they ensure that countries have independent fundamentals and that the two countries
have identically distributed output growth, so that any correlations or asymmetries that emerge are
endogenous. The same calibration is used throughout the paper.
















Figure 2: Left: The exchange rate|the relative price of good 2 in units of good 1|plotted on a
logarithmic scale against s, the output share of country 1. Right: Price-dividend ratio on asset 1,
plotted against s, in the imperfect substitution case  = 2 (black) and the perfect substitution case
(dashed red).
The next result provides integral formulas for the price-dividend ratios of the two countries'
output claims and for the prices of perpetuities that deliver a unit of good i per unit of time. Since
the integrands in these formulas decay exponentially fast, the integrals can be numerically evaluated
eectively instantaneously.8
Result 2 (Valuation ratios). The price-dividend ratios, Pit=Dit, of each country's output claim, and
the perpetuities denominated in each good, Bit, i = 1;2, are given by
P1t=D1t = V1;0(b ut) (12)
P2t=D2t = V0;1(b ut) (13)
B1t = V1 1=;0(b ut) (14)




eb u=2 + e b u=2
b  Z 1
 1
eib uvF(v)
   c[(1   b =2   iv);(2   b =2 + iv)]
dv (16)
and F(v) is dened in terms of the Beta function, F(v)  1
2  B(b =2   iv;b =2 + iv).
8The integrals can also be expressed in closed form in terms of hypergeometric functions if output growth is
lognormal, as in Martin (2011a).
12These valuation ratios move around over time as dividends, and hence b ut and st, move around.
Figure 2b plots the price-dividend ratio of the claim to country 1's output stream, P1=D1, against
country 1's output share, s. The solid line is the price-dividend ratio in the imperfect substitution
case, using the same calibration as above, and the dashed line shows the price-dividend ratio in the
perfect substitutes case.
The price-dividend ratio increases sharply as country 1's share of output declines in both the
perfect and imperfect substitution cases, though the eect is muted in the latter case. To understand
why, we must turn to the behavior of interest rates and risk premia.
Each good has its own set of zero-coupon bond prices, and attached to these bond prices are
zero-coupon yields, which also move around over time, as shocks to the dividends of the two trees
induce changes in b u. Three measures of interest rates9 are particularly natural: the riskless rates for
each good, calculated from zero-coupon yields in the limit as T # 0; coupon yields on perpetuities,
1=BiT, provided by equations (14) and (15); and long rates, which are calculated from zero-coupon
yields as T " 1.
Result 3 (Interest rates). Writing YT;i(b u) for the continuously compounded T-period zero-coupon






eb u=2 + e b u=2
b  Z 1
 1







eb u=2 + e b u=2
b  Z 1
 1
eib uvF(v)e f c[( b =2 iv);(1 1= b =2+iv)]gT dv

:
The riskless rates, Rf;i(b u) = limT#0 YT;i(b u), i = 1;2, are
Rf;1(b u) =

eb u=2 + e b u=2
b  Z 1
 1
eib uvF(v)f   c[(1   1=   b =2   iv);( b =2 + iv)]g dv
Rf;2(b u) =

eb u=2 + e b u=2
b  Z 1
 1
eib uvF(v)f   c[( b =2   iv);(1   1=   b =2 + iv)]g dv:
9These are \own-rates of interest"|a concept emphasized by Sraa (1932), who also provides a picturesque de-
scription of covered interest parity: \[W]e need not stretch our imagination and think of an organised loan market
amongst savages bartering deer for beavers. Loans are currently made in the present world in terms of every commodity
for which there is a forward market. When a cotton spinner borrows a sum of money for three months and uses the
proceeds to purchase spot, a quantity of raw cotton which he simultaneously sells three months forward, he is actually
`borrowing cotton' for that period. The rate of interest which he pays, per hundred bales of cotton, is the number of
bales that can be purchased with the following sum of money: the interest on the money required to buy spot 100
bales, plus the excess (or minus the deciency) of the spot over the forward prices of the 100 bales."
13Long rates, Y1;i  limT"1 YT;i(b u), are independent of b u, hence constant over time:
Y1;1 = max
2[0;+ 1]
   c(   ; ) (17)
Y1;2 = max
2[1 ;]
   c(   ; ): (18)
In this notation, the currently prevailing one-year rate in country j, as discussed in Section 1, is
ij;t = Y1;j(b u). Figure 3a shows how the riskless rate (black solid line), perpetuity yield (red dashed
line), and long rate (blue dotted line) depend on s. Riskless rates are low when s is close to 0 or to 1
due to precautionary savings demand in the face of an unbalanced|because poorly technologically
diversied|economy, and high when s is close to 0.5. Country 1's yield curve can be upward-sloping
(if its output share is close to 0 or to 1), downward-sloping (if its output share is close to about 0.45),
or hump-shaped (for output shares close to 0.3 or to 0.6).








(a) Interest rates plotted against output share







(b) Forward and expected spot exchange rates
Figure 3: Left: The riskless rate (black solid), perpetuity yield (red dashed), and long rate (blue
dotted) in 1-units plotted against s. Right: Forward price to time t of good 2 in 1-units (F0!t, black
solid), expected future spot prices (Eet = E1=et, red dashed), and forward price of good 1 in 2-units
(1=F0!t, blue dotted), plotted against t, assuming starting share s = 20%.
The gure is not symmetric: the interest rate in good 1 is higher when country 1 is small than
when it is large. In this example, as country 1's share of global output declines to zero, its interest
rate approaches 3.25% while the large country's interest rate drops to 1.18%. From the perspective
of an investor (or economist) thinking in large country units, this might suggest the following carry
trade: borrow at the large-country interest rate of 1.18%, and invest in the small-country interest
rate of 3.25%. We have not yet taken into account the eects of exchange-rate movements, however.
Before doing so, remember that in this example the exchangeability property holds:
14Property 1 (Exchangeability). c(1;2) = c(2;1) for all 1;2.
From Result 1, we know that (FX
1 + FX
2)=2, is positive. But by the exchangeability property,
we also know from equations (10) and (11) that FX
1 = FX
2, and hence that both are strictly
positive. Thus exchange rate movements actually work in favor of the carry trade. The reason for
the carry trade's excess return is (of course) that it is risky: if the large country has bad news, the
small country's exchange rate deteriorates, and the carry trade has a low return.
Returning to the general case, we can now see how the model generates the failure of uncovered
interest parity in the regression (2). From equation (9) we see that, by construction, log et+1 loget is
independent of information known at time t, because b ut inherits the independent increments property
from the L evy process that drives fundamentals. Therefore cov(log et+1   loget;i1;t   i2;t) = 0;
combining this with the fact that var(i1;t   i2;t) 6= 0, we have
Result 4 (Failure of UIP). Interest-rate dierentials are totally uninformative about future move-
ments of the exchange rate: plim(a1) = 0 for generic calibrations.
Given that the random walk nature of loget+1   loget was hard-wired in, the interesting aspect
of the model is not that it generates cov(loget+1   loget;i1;t   i2;t) = 0, but that interest rates can
vary across countries, var(i1;t   i2;t) 6= 0, despite the random walk character of exchange rates.
We can also interpret the failure of UIP in terms of forward rates. Dene F0!t to be the time-0
forward price of good 2 in 1-units, for settlement at t. A standard no-arbitrage argument implies
that this forward exchange rate is determined by the spot exchange rate and t-period interest rates
in the two countries: F0!t = e0  expf(Yt;1   Yt;2)tg. Figure 3b shows how the forward exchange
rates F0!t (black solid line) and 1=F0!t (blue dotted line) compare to expected future spot exchange
rates Eet and E1=et (red dashed line) in the numerical example. The starting share of country 1
is s = w = 0:2, so the current spot exchange rate is e0 = 1. Since the example features symmetric
output growth processes, expected future spot exchange rates (shown as a dashed red line) are
the same from the perspective of both countries|Eet = E1=et|and they lie above the spot price
(Siegel's paradox again). The forward price of good 2 is even higher than its expected future spot
price, while the forward price of good 1 moves in the opposite direction to its expected future spot
price, because interest rates are higher in country 1 than in country 2. This is another manifestation
of the violation of UIP.10
10I plot Figure 3b in levels rather than in logs to show the limited quantitative importance of Siegel's paradox. In
logs, Figure 3b would show expected appreciation of the log exchange rate equal to zero at all time horizons, and the
lines depicting forward prices would fan out symmetrically around it.
15When the exchangeability property holds, long rates, unlike short rates, are equal across countries:
Y1;1 = Y1;2. Given that long rates are constant, this is economically obvious, but to see it formally,
rewrite equation (18) as Y1;2 = max2[0;+ 1]  c( ; ). This equals Y1;1, given in equation
(17), because c( ;   ) = c(   ; ) by exchangeability. This has an implication that is
interesting in its own right: Y1;1 = Y1;2 =  c( =2; =2), so long rates are independent of the
elasticity of substitution between goods.








This expected return is calculated in the asset's own units. The expected return on asset 2 in units















The dividend yield component of expected returns is unit-free, but the expected capital gains com-
ponent depends on exchange rate movements. To the extent that these are correlated with asset
prices, there will be an associated risk premium.
Result 5 (Expected returns). Expected returns, ER1;2;1;2(b u), are given by
ER1;2;1;2(b u) =
1 + G1;2;1;2(b u)
V1;2(b u)
(19)










eib uvF(v)c(1 + m   b =2   iv;2   m + b =2 + iv)
   c[(1   b =2   iv);(2   b =2 + iv)]
dv;
and the values of 1;2;1;2, which depend on the asset and reference units of interest, are provided
in Table 1.
Figure 4 shows how risk premia on the good-1 consol bond and on asset 1, in each set of units,
depend on s. Own-unit risk premia are shown in black, and foreign-unit risk premia are shown as
blue dotted lines. The risk premia that would prevail if the goods of the two countries were perfect
substitutes are shown as red dashed lines.
Country 1's bond earns a risk premium in its own units because interest rates rise in bad times:
if country 1 is small|s is small|then bad times correspond to bad news for country 2 and hence
to a rise in s and (see Figure 3) country 1's riskless rate; and if country 1 is large|s is large|then
16Expected returns in 1-units Expected returns in 2-units
1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2
tree 1 1 0 1 0 1 0  1   
tree 2 0 1 1     0 1 0 1
bond 1 1   1= 0 0 0 1   1= 0    1 1   
bond 2 0 1   1= 1       1 0 1   1= 0 0
Table 1: Values of 1;2;1;2 for Result 5.





(a) Good-1 bond risk premia







(b) Asset 1 risk premia
Figure 4: Left: Good-1 bond risk premia in 1-units (black solid) and in 2-units (blue dotted) and,
for comparison, in the perfect substitutes case (red dashed). Right: Asset 1 risk premia in 1-units
(black solid) and in 2-units (blue dotted) and in the perfect substitutes case (red dashed).
bad times correspond to bad news for country 1, and hence to a decline in s and a rise in country 1's
riskless rate. Thinking in foreign units, the sign of the risk premium on country 1's bonds depends
on the size of country 1. If it is small, then the risk premium on country 1's bond is even larger, due
to the relative price eects discussed above: bad states of the world are those in which country 2 has
bad news, the relative supply of country 1's good increases, and its relative price declines. This poor
performance in bad states makes country 1's bonds risky, so they require a sizeable risk premium.
If, on the other hand, country 1 is large, then bad states of the world are associated with a decline
in the relative supply of its own good, associated with a favorable exchange rate adjustment. That
is, country 1's bond is a hedge, so it earns a negative risk premium.
Figure 4b plots risk premia for asset 1 itself. In own units, the risk premium on asset 1 increases as
country 1's output share|and hence its correlation with overall consumption|increases. In foreign
17units, the exchange rate eect described in the previous paragraph continues to operate, driving the
risk premium up if country 1 is small, or down if country 1 is large.
4 The small-country limit
These complicated characterizations of riskless rates, price-dividend ratios, and expected returns
simplify considerably in the small-country limit in which country 1 is very small and country 2
very large; the ability to take limits of the integral formulas is a major advantage of my analytical
approach over the loglinearization approach. In the limit, several features of the model emerge more
clearly, and those emphasized in the example above turn out to be characteristic of a whole family
of possible calibrations.11
In this section, I assume that    c(;1      ) > 0, so that the price-dividend ratio of each
country's output claim is nite in the limit;12 that Rf;1 > 0 and Rf;2 > 0, so that perpetuities have
nite prices; and, strengthening Assumption 1, that  > 2.13
Result 6 (Asset pricing in the small-country limit). Interest rates are
Rf;1 =    c(   1;1      ) (20)
Rf;2 =    c(0; ): (21)
Since interest rates are constant, perpetuities are riskless when denominated in their own units,
so do not earn a risk premium. But if returns are computed in foreign units, then a good-i perpetuity
does earn a risk premium, written XS
B;i, where
XS
B;1 = c(   1;1   ) + c(0; )   c(   1;1      ) (22)
XS
B;2 = c(1   ;   1) + c(   1;1      )   c(0; ): (23)
11By a continuity argument, the strict inequalities presented in Results 7, 8 and 9 of this section also hold away from
the limit point, so long as country 1 is suciently small relative to country 2.
12Rather than merely for s 2 (0;1), as is ensured by previous assumptions. Strictly speaking, we could allow
   c(;1      ) < 0 so long as    c(0;1   ) > 0, because this is enough to ensure that the large country's output
claim has a nite price-dividend ratio in the limit. But since this possibility was considered in detail in Martin (2011a),
where it was described as the supercritical case, and since it is harder for the inequalities    c(;1      ) < 0
and    c(0;1   ) > 0 to hold simultaneously if  is close to zero|that is, if imperfect substitution is an important
factor|I rule it out for simplicity.
13There is no real need for this last assumption; I make it because it seems uncontroversial, and because it reduces
the number of cases to consider in Results 7, 8 and 9.
18The dividend yields on the output claims are
D1=P1 =    c(;1      ) (24)
D2=P2 =    c(0;1   ): (25)
Excess returns denominated in own units, XSi, are given by
XS1 = c(1;0) + c(   1;1      )   c(;1      ) (26)
XS2 = c(0;1) + c(0; )   c(0;1   ): (27)
Excess returns denominated in foreign units, XS
i , are given by
XS
1 = c(;1   ) + c(0; )   c(;1      ) (28)
XS
2 = c(1   ;) + c(   1;1      )   c(0;1   ): (29)
The Gordon growth model holds: Di=Pi = XSi + Rf;i   Gi, where G1  c(1;0) and G2  c(0;1)
are the (log) mean growth rates of output in each country.
In one sense, asset pricing in the large country is just closed-economy asset pricing: equations
(21), (25) and (27) correspond directly to those derived in the one-tree economy of Martin (2010).
But, for example, the risk premium on the large stock market in small-country units, given by
equation (29), is a natural object of interest in a multi-country world that has no counterpart in a
single closed economy.
As one would expect, the excess return on investment in a foreign country's bond can be de-
composed as the sum of an interest-rate dierential and an expected currency return, since we can
rewrite equations (22) and (23) as XS
B;1 = FX
1 + Rf;1   Rf;2 and XS
B;2 = FX
2 + Rf;2   Rf;1.
To put these expressions in more familiar form, suppose that output growth is lognormal, and
make the cet. par. assumption that the exchangeability property holds. Then c(1;2) = 1+2+
22
1=2+212+22
2=2, where  is the mean,  the volatility, and  the cross-country correlation
19of log output growth in the two countries, and we have
Rf;1 =  +    22=2 + 2(1   )(1   )( +    1)
Rf;2 =  +    22=2
XS
B;1 = 2(1   )(1   )
XS
B;2 =  ( + 2   2)2(1   )(1   )
D1=P1 =  + (   1)   2(   1)2=2   2(1   )( +    1)
D2=P2 =  + (   1)   2(   1)2=2
XS1 = 2 + 2(1   )(1   )
XS2 = 2
XS
1 = 2 + 2(1   )(1   )
XS
2 = 2   ( + 2   1)2(1   )(1   ):
In the perfect substitutes case,  = 1, there is no exchange-rate risk, so interest rates are equal
in each country, bonds are riskless, and the small country's equity claim is risky only to the extent
that its fundamentals are correlated with the large country's fundamentals. All this changes if the
goods are imperfect substitutes ( < 1). The interest rate is higher in the small than in the large
country; the excess return on the small country's bond in large units is positive, while that on the
large country's bond in small units is negative; and the small country's dividend yield increases, and
its equity risk premium increases|particularly when denominated in foreign units|as exchange-rate
risk becomes important.14
Without the exchangeability assumption, the signs of most of these risk premia can be set ar-
bitrarily even in the lognormal case (for example, by making the small country's output extremely
volatile, and adjusting its correlation with the large country). The only risk premium for which
this is not true is that of the large country's equity claim denominated in large units, which is al-
ways positive. In the lognormal case, this is obvious. Although it is no surprise that XS2 > 0
in general, the proof that it holds illustrates how the convexity property of CGFs can be ex-
14Although this particular example should not be taken too literally, it is interesting to note how the extra risk premia
that are in principle observable in a two-country world permit the model's deep parameters to be easily identied. For
example, observing equity premia in each country in own units (XS1 and XS2) together with the small country's bond




1) enables , ,  and  to be identied. (This is not vacuous, since
the equations are nonlinear.) Observing the riskless rate and dividend yield on either country's output claim would
also enable  and  to be identied.
20ploited. For, XS2 = c(0;1) + c(0; )   c(0;1   ), and note that (0;1) and (0; ), considered as
points in R2, are a midpoint-preserving-spread of (0;1   ) and (0;0). Convexity then implies that
c(0;1) + c(0; ) > c(0;1   ) + c(0;0), and the result follows because c(0;0) = 0. Figure 6b in
Appendix B illustrates this logic graphically. This graphical approach was essential in nding proofs
of the more complicated results in the remainder of this section. See Appendix A for the conventional
proofs, and Appendix B for the visual proofs.
To put some discipline on the model without making strong parametric assumptions, it is helpful
to focus attention away from the details of the countries' output processes by assuming that the
exchangeability property holds. We then have the following result.
Result 7 (Strong failure of UIP for the small country). Suppose Property 1 holds. Then the interest
rate in the small country is higher than the interest rate in the large country: Rf;1 > Rf;2. But
this higher interest rate is not oset by expected exchange rate movements. On the contrary, the
expected appreciations in the relative price of each country's good are equal, and positive|Siegel's
(1972) \paradox" once again. Thus uncovered interest parity (UIP) fails in a strong sense: not only
do expected exchange rate movements not fully oset the small country's higher interest rate, they
actually increase the expected return on the carry trade. That is, XS
B;1 > FX
1 > 0.
The corresponding result for the large country relies on a property that restricts the behavior of
the higher cumulants of output growth.
Property 2 (Convex dierences). The CGF c(;) has the convex dierence property (CDP) if
c(1;2)   c(1 + t;2 + t) is convex in (1;2) for all t > 0, 1, and 2 such that (1;2) and
(1 + t;2 + t) lie in the triangle   R2 whose corners are at (1;1), (1;    1) and (    1;1).
This property imposes a restriction that neither country has positively skewed log output growth.
If, for example, output growth is independent in the two countries, so that c(1;2) can be expressed
as c1(1) + c2(2), then it is equivalent to c000
i (i)  0, i = 1;2, in the triangle . In particular,
c000
i (0)  0: that is, the third cumulant|skewness|cannot be positive. It is also satised if output
growth is lognormal, in disaster calibrations of the type suggested in Barro (2006), and in the
numerical example presented in this paper.15
When it holds, the large country's bond earns a negative risk premium from the perspective
of investors thinking in small-country units|a type of \exorbitant privilege" (Gourinchas and Rey
(2007), quoting Val ery Giscard d'Estaing).
15The visual proofs, specically Figures 8b and 10b, reveal why the convex dierence property is formulated as it is.
21Result 8 (An exorbitant privilege). Suppose Properties 1 and 2 hold. Then UIP also fails for the
large country, which has the \exorbitant privilege" of paying a negative risk premium on its bonds in
small-country units: XS
B;2 < 0.
Result 7 showed only that the riskless rate is higher in the small country than in the large
country. Result 8 is stronger: it can be rephrased as saying that the (unfavorable) riskless rate
dierential faced by an investor who borrows at the small country's interest rate and invests at the
large country's interest rate is suciently large that it overcomes the favorable expected exchange
rate movement: Rf;1   Rf;2 > FX
2.
To characterize the risk premia on the two countries' output claims, I make a nal assumption
that the countries have linked fundamentals: in the lognormal case, for example, I want to rule out
the possibility that the correlation between the two countries' output growth is negative so that the
small country's output claim is a hedge. The following property turns out to be the appropriate way
to capture this idea.
Property 3 (Linked fundamentals). The two countries have linked fundamentals if the CGF is
supermodular,16 meaning that for all 1;2;1;2 in ,
c(1;2) + c(1;2)  c(maxf1;1g;maxf2;2g) + c(minf1;1g;minf2;2g):





for all 1 and 2 in some open set containing . It is immediate that the linked fundamentals property
holds (with equality) if output growth is independent across countries. In any given parametric
example, it is easy to check whether (30) holds. In the lognormal case, (30) shows that the linked
fundamentals property is equivalent to the correlation between the two countries' log output growth
being nonnegative.17
16Vives (1990), Milgrom and Roberts (1990a, 1990b), and Athey (2002) present various economic applications of
supermodularity|in particular, to games with strategic complementarities. By Lemma 4 of Athey (2002), supermod-
ularity of the CGF is implied by log-supermodularity of the probability density function of (y1;t+1  y1;t;y2;t+1  y2;t);
this provides another way of generating examples in which the linked fundamentals property holds.
17As with the convex dierence property, the easiest and best way to understand what supermodularity imposes is
visually. See Figure 9c and the discussion in the caption.
22Result 9. Suppose Properties 1, 2 and 3 hold. Then there is a critical value  2 (1;1)|where
 = 2 in the lognormal case|such that
0 < XS1 < XS
1 < XS
2 < XS2 if  > 
0 < XS1 < XS
2 < XS
1 < XS2 if  < :
We also have XS
B;1  XS
1.
If the countries have strictly linked fundamentals18 and  is suciently large then we have a total
ordering of risk premia: XS
B;2 < 0 < XS
B;1 < XS1 < XS
1 < XS
2 < XS2.
Result 9 extends the model's predictions regarding bond risk premia to risky assets. The risk
premium on the small country's output claim is greater in foreign units than in own units, XS
1 >
XS1, while the risk premium on the large country's claim is smaller in foreign units than in own units,
XS
2 < XS2. The size of  indexes the amount of currency risk. If the goods of the two countries
are suciently poor substitutes ( < ), then currency risk is so great that the risk premium on the
small country's output claim in foreign units exceeds the risk premium on the large country's claim
in foreign units, XS
1 > XS
2, even though the small country contributes a negligible proportion of
the representative agent's consumption.
5 Conclusion
The logic of this paper rests on a fundamental asymmetry: the representative agent cares more about
the large country than the small country, since it provides a larger share of consumption. As a result,
when the large country has bad news the relative price of its output increases, while the relative price
of the small country's output decreases. As a result, interest rates dier across countries. Since, by
construction, the exchange rate follows a random walk, UIP fails in any calibration.
In the small-country limit, some of the complications of the model evaporate, leaving behind the
central intuition. It is then possible to characterize how UIP fails across whole families of possible
calibrations that satisfy some rather general nonparametric restrictions on the cumulant-generating
function. If, say, the random variables driving output growth in the two countries are exchangeable|
loosely speaking, if the two countries have symmetric, but not necessarily independent, output growth
distributions|then the small country's exchange rate is expected to appreciate. Even so, its bonds
are riskier, and so earn a higher interest rate, than the large country's bonds.
18That is, if the inequality in the denition of Property 3 is strict.
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A Appendix
Recall the notation  = (   1)= and b  = ( +    1)=, and let b y1t  y1t + [(1   )=]logw and
b y2t  y2t + [(1   )=]log(1   w). We also dened the state variable st: st  D1t=(D1t + et  D2t) 2
(0;1) and b ut, a monotonic transformation of st: b ut  log[(1   st)=st]. This denition implies that
b ut = (b y2t   b y1t).
The consumption aggregator can be expressed as
Ct =
h
eb y10+e y1t + eb y20+e y2t
i 1
 ; (31)














 e [(1 )=]b ut: (32)
If  = 1|the perfect substitutes case|then  = 1 so et is constant. If, on the other hand,
 = 1, then Ct is a Cobb-Douglas aggregator of the two goods so that Ct / Dw
1tD1 w
2t . It is easy to
check that this implies that the price-dividend ratio of each asset is constant. Here I assume that




















































A perpetuity, or consol, that pays a constant stream of good 1, at rate 1 per unit time is just a
portfolio of zero-coupon bonds, so integrating the above expression over t, we nd the perpetuity



























































































where the values of 1 and 2 corresponding to the various assets are given in Table 2.
Proof of Result 2: Expression (40) can be rewritten
E(1;2) = e b (b y10+b y20)=2  E
 
e(1 b =2)e y1t+(2 b =2)e y2t







B1;ZT;1 1   1= 0
B2;ZT;2 0 1   1=
Table 2: Values of 1 and 2 in (40); all assets priced in own units.
Martin (2011a) shows the Fourier transform result that for ! 2 R and b  > 0,
1
 




where i is the complex number
p
 1 and F(v)  1
2 B(b =2+iv;b =2 iv) denes F(v) in terms of
the Euler beta function. Applying this, we nd that
E(1;2) = e b (b y10+b y20)=2  E

e(1 b =2)e y1t+(2 b =2)e y2t
Z 1
 1
ei(b y20+e y2t b y10 e y1t)vF(v)dv

= e b (b y10+b y20)=2
Z 1
 1
eib uvF(v)  ec((1 b =2 iv);(2 b =2+iv))t dv (42)
where b u  (b y20   b y10).
The generic expression we want to evaluate is








e(b y10+e y1t) + e(b y20+e y2t)b  dt
=

eb y10 + eb y20b 
eb (b y10+b y20)=2 
Z 1
0
e t  eb (b y10+b y20)=2  E(1;2)dt
=
h
eb u=2 + e b u=2




e f c[(1 b =2 iv);(2 b =2+iv)]gteib uvF(v)dv dt
=
h
eb u=2 + e b u=2
ib  Z 1
 1
eib uvF(v)
   c[(1   b =2   iv);(2   b =2 + iv)]
dv (43)
using (42) and assuming    c[(1   b =2);(2   b =2)] > 0. Using the results of Appendix A.3 of
Martin (2011a), this ensures that for all v 2 R, Re  c[(1   b =2   iv);(2   b =2 + iv)] > 0, as
required.







= c(w1;w2)ew1b y1t+w2b y2t dt: (44)
28The result follows by applying (44) to equation (9), using the denition of b u; the proof of Siegel's
paradox follows by the convexity of the CGF, which implies that c( 1;1 )+c(1 ; 1) > 0.
For a visual proof, see Appendix B.
Proof of Result 3: Using the preceding results in equations (35) and (38), we have
Zt;1 =















eib uvF(v)e f c[( b =2 iv);(1 1= b =2+iv)]gt dv:
The zero-coupon yields follow immediately; and using l'H^ opital's rule to take the limit as t # 0, the
riskless rate expressions follow too.
To calculate long rates, we use the method of steepest descent. In the case of the long rate in
1-units, which is







eib uvF(v)e f c[(1 1= b =2 iv);( b =2+iv)]gt dv

;
we are interested in a stationary point of  c[(1 1= b =2 iv);( b =2+iv)], considered as a
function of v 2 C. If v = ix is pure imaginary, this function is concave when considered as a function
of x 2 R (Martin (2011a)), so has a stationary point at some ix, x 2 R. If jxj < =2 then the
contour of integration can be continuously deformed to pass through the stationary point without
crossing a pole. It follows by the method of steepest descent that Y1;1(b u) =  c[(1 1= b =2+
x);( b =2   x)]. If, on the other hand, the stationary point occurs for x > b =2, then there is
a residue to take into account at v = (b =2)i; it turns out that Y1;1(b u) =    c[   1;1      ].
Similarly, if the stationary point occurs at x <  b =2 then Y1;1(b u) =    c[ ;0].
These cases can be summarized by writing Y1;1 = max2[ b =2;b =2]    c[(1   1=   b =2 +
s);( b =2   s)], or equivalently, Y1;1 = max2[0;+ 1]    c(   ; ).
By exchangeability, the long rate in 2-units is Y1;2 = max2[0;+ 1]  c( ;  ), which can
also be rewritten as Y1;2 = max2[1 ;]    c(   ; ).
Proof of Result 4: A proof was provided in the text.
Proof of Result 5: The dividend yield component of the expected return is the reciprocal of the
valuation ratio, so it remains to calculate EdP=P.
The general problem we face has
P = e1b y1t+2b y2t

e(b y1t b y2t)=2 + e(b y2t b y1t)=2
b  Z 1
 1
ei(b y2t b y1t)vF(v)
   c[(1   b =2   iv);(2   b =2 + iv)]
dv ;









F(v)eb y1t(1+m b =2 iv)+b y2t(2 m+b =2+iv)
   c[(1   b =2   iv);(2   b =2 + iv)]
dv ;






F(v)c(1 + m   b =2   iv;2   m + b =2 + iv)e
b y1t(1+m b =2 iv)+b y2t(2 m+b =2+iv)
   c[(1   b =2   iv);(2   b =2 + iv)]
dv :










eib uvF(v)c(1 + m   b =2   iv;2   m + b =2 + iv)
   c[(1   b =2   iv);(2   b =2 + iv)]
dv:
Proof of Result 6: The proof is very similar to the proofs of Propositions 6 and 7 in Martin
(2011a), so is omitted.
Proof of Result 7: To show that Rf;1 > Rf;2, I must show that c(0; ) c( 1;1  ) > 0.
Invoking exchangeability, this is equivalent to showing that c(0; ) + c( ;0)   c(   1;1     
)   c(1      ;   1) > 0. But this is an immediate consequence of the fact that c(;), as a
cumulant-generating function, is strictly convex.
In Result 1, I showed that (FX
1 + FX
2)=2 > 0. Since we are assuming here that Property 1
holds, we have FX
1 = FX
2. Combining these two facts, it follows that FX
1 > 0 and FX
2 > 0.
Proof of Result 8: XS
B;2 < 0 if and only if c(0; ) c(1 ; 1) c( 1;1  ) > 0. By
exchangeability, this is equivalent to showing that c(0; ) + c( ;0)   c(   1;1      )   c(1  
   ;   1)   c(1   ;   1)   c(   1;1   ) > 0. By strict convexity of the CGF, this is true so
long as [c( 1 =2;1  =2) 2c( =2; =2)+c(1  =2; 1 =2)] [c(1 ; 1) 
2c(0;0)+ c( 1;1 )]  0. (Here I am using the fact that  +2 2 > 0, which follows because
of the assumption that  > 2.) But this holds because the convex dierence property ensures that
the rst term in square brackets is (weakly) greater than the second term in square brackets.
Proof of Result 9: To show that XS1 > 0, I must show that c(1;0)+c( 1;1  ) c(;1 
   ) > 0. This is equivalent to [c(1;0)   c(;0)   c(0;0) + c(   1;0)] + [c(;0)   c(   1;0)  
c(;1      ) + c(   1;1      )] > 0. This holds because the rst term in square brackets is
positive due to strict convexity of the CGF, and the second is nonnegative by supermodularity.
By exchangeability, XS1 < XS
1 is equivalent to [c( ;0)+c(0; ) c( 1;1  ) c(1 
   ;   1)]   [c(1;0) + c(0;1)   c(;1   )   c(1   ;)] > 0. By strict convexity of the CGF,
it suces to show that [c( =2   1=2; =2 + 1=2) + c( =2 + 1=2; =2   1=2)   c( =2 + 1=2  
30;  1=2+) c( =2 1=2+; =2+1=2 )] [c(1;0)+c(0;1) c(;1 ) c(1 ;)]  0,
which holds by the convex dierence property. The proof that XS1 < XS
2 is very similar, so is
omitted.
By exchangeability, XS
1 < XS2 is equivalent to [c(;1  )+c(1  ;) c(0;1 ) 
c(1 ;0)]+[c(1;0)+c(0;1) c(;1 ) c(1 ;)] > 0. But each of the terms in square brackets
is positive by strict convexity of the CGF. The proof that XS
2 < XS2 is very similar, so is omitted.
The nal inequality that holds independent of conditions on  is that XS
B;1  XS
1. This is
equivalent to c(;1   )   c(;1      )   c(   1;1   ) + c(   1;1      )  0, which follows
from supermodularity.
By exchangeability, the sign of XS
2 XS
1 is the same as the sign of the (strictly convex) function
Q()  c(   1;1      ) + c(1      ;   1)   c(0;1   )   c(1   ;0)   c(0; )   c( ;0) +
c(;1  )+c(1  ;). Now, Q(0) = c( 1;1 )+c(1 ; 1) c(0; ) c( ;0) < 0
and Q(1) =  c(0;1   )   c(1   ;0) + c(1; ) + c( ;1) > 0 by strict convexity of c(;). Q()
is also continuous; thus, Q() = 0 for some unique  2 (0;1). Dening  via  = 1   1=, we
have XS
2 = XS
1 if  = ; XS
2 < XS
1 for  < ; and XS
2 > XS
1 for  > .
It remains to be shown that XS
B;1 < XS1 if the CGF is strictly supermodular and  is suciently
large; equivalently, c(   1;1   ) + c(0; )   2c(   1;1      )   c(1;0) + c(;1      ) < 0.
In the case  = 1, we must show that c(0; ) + c(1;0)   c(1; ) > 0 = c(0;0). This follows by
strict supermodularity. Therefore by continuity, XS
B;1 < XS1 for  in some neighborhood of 1;
equivalently, XS
B;1 < XS1 for suciently large .














(b) Pi=Di ( = 1)








(c) Pi=Di ( = 2)








(d) Pi=Di ( = 1)






(e) Pi (large units,  = 1)






(f) Pi (large units,  = 2)






(g) Pi (large units,  = 1)






(h) Pi (small units,  = 1)






(i) Pi (small units,  = 2)






(j) Pi (small units,  = 1)
Figure 5: Sample paths of price-dividend ratios, Pi=Di, and prices, Pi of output claims of each
country, for dierent values of . All paths are based on the same underlying path of fundamentals,




















(b) This is positive, by convexity
Figure 6: Left: A visual proof of Siegel's paradox. We must show that c( 1;1 )+c(1 ; 1) >
0, or equivalently, because c(0;0) = 0, that c(   1;1   )   2c(0;0) + c(1   ;   1) > 0. Panel
(a) represents the left-hand side of this inequality in the sense that the signed sum of values taken
by the CGF at the indicated points (with signs indicated by black plus and red minus signs) is
the expression on the left-hand side. I will say that the panel is positive if the signed sum that it
represents is positive. So, the aim is to show that the panel is positive. Convexity of the CGF gives
the result.
Right: A visual proof that the large country requires a positive risk premium in own units, XS2 > 0.
We must show that c(0;1) + c(0; )   c(0;1   )   c(0;0) > 0. The result follows by convexity of
the CGF.
Note: Part of the advantage of the visual approach, once you're used to it, is that it is immediately
clear if an expression is positive by virtue of convexity. We require the four points to be arranged




















(b) ...use exchangeability then convexity
Figure 7: A visual proof that the small country's bond earns an excess return in foreign units
that is greater than the expected currency return, XS
B;1 > FX
1. We must show that c(0; )  
c(   1;1      ) > 0, i.e. that panel (a) is positive. By exchangeability, this is equivalent to
c(0; ) + c( ;0)   c(   1;1      )   c(1      ;   1) > 0. Graphically, this corresponds
to reecting in the 45 degree line, as shown in panel (b). Panel (b) is positive by convexity, so the
result follows.
Note: from now on, I will exploit exchangeability without further comment. When I do, I plot the
45 degree line.













(a) To prove this is positive...













(b) ...use convexity then CDP
Figure 8: A visual proof that the large country's bond earns a negative risk premium in foreign units,
XS
B;2 < 0. Exchangeability has already been used in the left panel. In each panel, there are two
groups of points, running from north-west to south-east. In the right panel, the four south-west-most
points have been compressed towards their mid-point. By convexity, this makes the sum smaller.
Even so, it remains positive, by the convex dierence property, and thus the left panel was also
positive.
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(c) ...and this is, by supermodularity
Figure 9: A visual proof that the risk premium on the small country's output claim is positive in own
units, XS1 > 0. The top panel, which represents XS1, is the sum of the bottom two panels. Now,
panel (b) is strictly positive by convexity of the CGF and panel (c) is nonnegative by supermodularity.
The CGF is zero at the origin, so the top panel really is the sum of the bottom two panels.
Note: panel (c) illustrates what supermodularity \is", namely the property that every rectangle with
this sign pattern is positive.

















(a) To prove this is positive...

















(b) ...use convexity then CDP
Figure 10: A visual proof that the risk premium on the small country's output claim is higher in
foreign units than it is in own units, XS1 < XS
1. The logic is as in Figure 8.


























(b) Positive by supermodularity
Figure 11: Left: A visual proof that the risk premium on the large country's output claim, in large-
country units, is higher than the risk premium on the small country's output claim, in large-country
units, XS
1 < XS2. Exchangeability has already been used. The two groups of points are both
positive by convexity of the CGF.
Right: A visual proof that in large-country units, the small country's output claim requires a (weakly)
higher risk premium than its bond, XS
B;1  XS
1. The result follows immediately by supermodu-
larity.
38